chainguard-dev / osquery-defense-kit
- понедельник, 24 октября 2022 г. в 00:35:21
Production-ready detection & response queries for osquery
Production-ready detection & response queries for osquery
ODK (osquery-defense-kit) is unique in that the queries are designed to be used as part of a production detection & response pipeline. The detection queries are formulated to return zero rows during normal expected behavior, so that they may be configured to generate alerts when rows are returned.
At the moment, these queries are predominantly designed for execution on POSIX platforms (Linux & macOS). Pull requests to improve support on other platforms are fully welcome.
detection/
- Threat detection queries tuned for alert generation.policy/
- Security policy queries tuned for alert generation.response/
- Data collection to assist in responding to possible threats. Tuned for periodic evidence collection.The detection queries are further divided up by MITRE ATT&CK tactics categories.
At release time, the queries are packed up in osquery query pack format. See Local Pack Generation
for information on how to generate your own packs at any time.
https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/shikitega-new-stealthy-malware-targeting-linux
Here is a partial list of what queries would have fired an alert based on these queries:
execution/tiny-executable-events.sql
execution/tiny-executable.sql
execution/tiny-executable-events.sql
execution/tiny-executable.sql
execution/unexpected-shell-parents.sql
execution/sketchy-fetchers.sql
execution/sketchy-fetcher-events.sql
c2/unexpected-talkers-linux.sql
c2/exotic-command-events.sql
c2/exotic-cmdline.sql
execution/unexpected-executable-permissions.sql
execution/unexpected-executable-directory-linux.sql
execution/unexpected-tmp-executables.sql
c2/exotic-command-events.sql
c2/exotic-cmdline.sql
initial_access/unexpected-shell-parents.sql
evasion/missing-from-disk-linux.sql
privesc/unexpected-setxid-process.sql
privesc/unexpected-privilege-escalation.sql
privesc/events/unexpected-privilege-escalation-events.sql
evasion/name_path_mismatch.sql
persistence/unexpected-cron-entries.sql
execution/unexpected-executable-directory-linux.sql
https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/07/19/i-see-what-you-did-there-look-cloudmensis-macos-spyware/
Here is a partial list of what stages would have been detected by particular queries:
Initial Dropper Execution, detected by:
c2/unexpected-talkers-macos.sql
Second Stage Execution, detected by:
execution/unexpected-executable-directory-macos.sql
persistence/unexpected-launch-daemon-macos.sql
execution/unexpected-mounts.sql
TCC Bypass, detected by:
evasion/unexpected-env-values.sql
Spy Agent Execution, detected by:
c2/unexpected-talkers-macos.sql
execution/exotic-command-events.sql
execution/unexpected-executable-directory-macos.sql
Run make packs
For more control, you can invoke osqtool directly, to override default intervals or exclude checks.
Help is wanted! We support any new queries so long as they can be easily updated to address false positives.
Users may submit false positive exceptions for popular well-known software packages, so long as evidence is provided for the behavior.
While originally focused on Linux and macOS, we support the addition of queries on any platform supported by osquery.
We endeavor to exclude real-world false positives from our detection
queries.
Managing false positives is easier said than done - pull requests are welcome!
In aggregate, queries should not consume more than 2% of the wall clock time across a day on a deployed system.
Deployed intervals are automatically determined based on the tags supported by the osqtool, which we use for pack assembly.